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Executive Summary
During the last five years, and more specifically since the US invasion of Irak,
different Sunni policy makers and religious actors have ventilated their concern
for what they see as the rise of Shiite Islam. Although the condemnation of Shi-
ism by more rigorous currents such as Wahhabism is hardly new, recently differ-
ent governments in the Middle East have taken concrete measures against Shiite
actors. The same ‘Cold War scenario’ the region witnessed immediately after the
Iranian Revolution seems to appear again, making Arab Sunni voices reverber-
ate up to Western policy makers, who start to worry themselves about the role
of Iran and its allies. In this paper we will try to give an evaluation of this alleged
shift in the Sunni-Shi`a power balance, and point out the possible consequences
for Belgium and the EU emanating from this controversy.
We have treated the subject from two different angles. First of all, we looked at
the level of regional politics and tried to formulate a context in which we have
to see the Sunni fear for the conception of a ‘Shiite Crescent’, a geopolitical
construction in which Shiites take over power in the Middle East, thus making
the region the backyard of Iran. We pointed out that it is a nationally focused
socio-political movement, aiming at emancipating the Shiites in their own
national context. The transnational system of religious guidance, the marja`iya,
is at the same time both a diversified, non-uniform source of religious and social
ideology, and a drive for Shiite political participation and adaptation. The Ira-
nian role in this construction is to be seen in the light of its hegemonic aspira-
tions, through the way of a pragmatic foreign policy. Its relations towards
regional allies is largely tactical, and not to be overestimated. The Islamic
Republic uses Shiite Islam more or less as a political instrument, surfing the
wave of the Shiite movement more than actually steering it. We conclude this
section with a first set of recommendations towards Belgium and the EU for
their policy in the Middle East.
The second part focuses on the actual Sunni-Shi`a relations, varying from a
Wahhabi hostility towards the religious identity of Shiism to a search for rap-
prochement and coexistence. Within Sunni circles like the Muslim Brotherhood,
a certain form of distrust and a hardened speech is apparently on the rise, espe-
cially regarding a perceived infiltration of Shiite Islam in what they call ‘Sunni’
countries. The same fear has recently been instrumentalized by Sunni regimes of
Egypt and Morocco, who undertook drastic measures to counter Iranian intru-
sion in their national sphere. The motives behind this are mainly a matter of
regime survival and safeguarding their strategic position in the region. An
important element in this controversy is the tashayyu` and Shiite proselytism, an
instrument used in the Iranian search for hegemony.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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To conclude the second part, we took a look at the European theatre, where we
can see a largely similar development as witnessed in the Middle East, with Iran
trying to gain influence amongst local Shiites. For the case of Belgium, the con-
troversy hanging over the Moroccan community is of specific interest, given the
concerns raised by Rabat on mass conversions towards Shiism taking place, thus
threatening to destabilize the Moroccan State.
Overall, the power balance Sunnism and Shiism is not so much a problem than
it is an expression of the existential fear of Sunni regimes. The red line within
this paper is thus the political use of Islamic confessional identities (Sunni and
Shi`a), in the framework of a regional political agenda. This will be, more than
a structural opposition between Sunnism and Shiism, a threat to confessional
coexistence, and can be a future cause for intra-Islamic strife.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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Introduction1
Some years ago, the Saudi preacher Mamduh ibn `Ali al-Harbi held a sermon
under the title of al-Ikhtabut ash-Shi`i fi’l-`Alam (‘The Shiite Octopus in the
world), brandishing Shiites as unbelievers, agents of Iran and criticizing their
hidden agenda to take over the Islamic World2. Although the condemnation of
Shiism by more rigorous Islamic currents such as Wahhabism, is hardly new,
recently different governments in the Middle East have addressed their deep
concerns and even took concrete measures against Shiite actors. The same ‘Cold
War scenario’ the region witnessed immediately after the Iranian Revolution
seems to appear again, making Arab Sunni voices reverberate up to Western
policy makers, who start to worry themselves about the role of Iran and its
allies.
In the first part of this work, we will treat the validity of the ‘Shiite Crescent’
idea and match this to the political development of Shiite3 actors in the Middle
East. We will also consider the role played by Iran in this story. After this, we
can already give some interim conclusions for Belgian and EU policy.
The second part will focus on the actual rhetoric used by different Sunni actors,
the actual extent of Shiite activism in ‘Sunni’ countries, and a sketch of the issues
that will be important for Europe and Belgium.
We will close our paper with conclusions and some operational recommenda-
tions for Belgian and European policy makers.
We want to stress that this paper does not have the pretence of being complete.
Considering the numerous aspects of the Sunni-Shi`a controversy on all levels of
Middle Eastern society, in combination with the striking lack of exact demo-
graphic numbers and figures4, studying Sunni-Shi`a relations becomes a some-
what difficult exercise. As a consequence, it is rather our aim to put this contro-
1. The author would like to thank the following people for their highly appreciated help: prof. dr. Sven
Biscop, prof. dr. Brigitte Maréchal, prof. dr. Sami Zemni, amb. dr. Raoul Delcorde, the follow-up commit-
tee at the Belgian Ministry of Foreign affairs, lt. col. Van Gils, lt. Pieter-Jan Parrein, CUTA (Belgian Coor-
dination Unit for Threat Analysis), prof. dr. Rik Coolsaet, and everyone who contributed, both in words
and deeds.
2. KAZIMI Nabras, ‘Zarqawi’s Anti-Shi`a Legacy: Original or Borrowed?’, Current Trends in Islamist
Ideology, n°5, 2006, p. 58.
3. When using the word ‘Shiism’ or ‘Shiite’, we refer to the Imami branch of Shiite Islam. Other branches
of Shiite origin, such as the Isma`iliya of Zaydiya are not considered in this paper due to their minority
position within the Shiite world and their relatively small impact in the Middle East, unless explicitly
mentioned.
4. Prof. Sabrina Mervin added an annex to her excellent book ‘Iran et les Mondes Chiites’ discussing the
validity of the different demographic data of Shiism (MERVIN Sabrina (ed.), Iran et les Mondes Chiites,
Karthala, Paris, 2007, p. 457-465).FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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versy in a more balanced perspective, stripped of its sometimes hysterical dimen-
sions, and to provoke further thinking and debate on confessional or other
dimensions (economic, family, tribal, etc.) involved in the development of intra-
Muslim relations.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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1. Shiites on a search for space
1.1. Coming to terms: Shiite crescent, Shiite Revival 
and their limitations
Since the US invasion in Iraq and the end of the Ba`th regime, much has been
said and written on Shiite empowerment and the apparent change in the ‘sectar-
ian power balance’ in the Middle East. In 2004 King `Abd Allah II of Jordan
expressed his fear for a ‘Shiite Crescent’, stretching from the Persian Gulf
towards the Mediterranean, the area thus becoming the backyard of Iran5. Two
years later, Egyptian president Husni Mubarak added to the controversy by stat-
ing that ‘Shiites are mostly always loyal to Iran and not to the countries they live
in’6. As such, this was soon to become a point of interest for Western scholars
studying the possibility of the Middle East being threatened by a rise in the Shiite
profile and the possible conflict with the Sunni majority connected to it. It was
for example Vali Nasr who stated in his famous article ‘When Shiites rise’:
“By liberating and empowering Iraq’s Shiite majority, the Bush admini-
stration helped launch a broad Shiite revival that will upset the sectarian
balance in Iraq and the Middle East for years to come.”7
In his book ‘The Shia Revival’, Nasr outlines the same prospects and foresees
violent conflicts between the two Islamic currents as a future threat within the
Muslim world. The work has high merit as an overview of Sunni-Shi`a relations
in the present age, but a much-heard critique is the overemphasis on the role of
religious identity in this controversy8.
For Iraq, the expected scenario came partially true: local Shiites did obtain
power through the means of democratic elections. The person who played a
major role in these developments was grand ayatollah `Ali Sistani, who appar-
ently left his political ‘quietism’ to organize, unite and guide the Iraqi Shiite
community towards empowerment. Throughout the region, especially in the
5. ‘Iraq: Jordan See Threat To Election From Iran’, Washington Post, 8 December 2004.
6. President Mubarak made the statements during an interview on the al-`Arabiya channel on 9 April
2006 (‘Iraqis Denounce Mubarak’s Remarks on Strife’, International Herald Tribune, 10 April 2006).
7. NASR Vali, ‘When the Shiites Rise’, Foreign Affairs, July – August 2006, (http://www.foreignaf-
fairs.com/articles/61733/vali-nasr/when-the-shiites-rise).
8. NASR Vali, The Shia Revival: how conflicts within Islam will shape the future, W.W. Norton & Com-
pany, New York & London, 2006, pp. 287.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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Gulf region9, coreligionists were indeed more motivated to demand their
national rights. At the same time, however, violent jihadist inspired groups,
causing civil strife, countered the Shiite agenda in Iraq.
But when translating the prospect of the ‘Shiite Crescent’ into a policy approach
with a regional framework, we come across some limitations, that do not only
make the concept as such highly problematic, but also prove that it lacks a cer-
tain touch with reality.
Historically speaking, the ‘Revival’ of Shiism is a phenomenon older than the
power shift in Iraq, and older than the Iranian Revolution. Of great influence
too were the rise of Shiite centers of learning, the revival of Usuli Shiism10 at the
end of the 18th century and the impact of Sunni modernist thinkers such as
Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897) or Muhammad `Abduh (d. 1905)11.
The first apparent signs of a Shiite activism came to the fore in Iran with the
Tobacco Crisis (1891-1892), the subsequent Constitutional Revolution (1905-
1911) and the 1920 Iraqi revolt against the British presence. The latter caused
the hawza (center of Shiite religious learning) of Najaf to decline in prominence.
The migration of Iraqi insurgent clerics towards Iran added to the revolutionary
climate in the religious center of Qom12.
During the following decennia the region witnessed the coming into being of
different Shiite politically active outfits, spearheaded by the political movement
of ad-Da`wa in Iraq in the 1950s. Elements of this organization were to have a
great influence on the spread of the Shiite socio-political ideology in the region,
notably in Lebanon and the Gulf. The latter was also the sphere of influence of
the Shiraziya, the network of Muhammad ash-Shirazi (d. 2001) and his off-
9. The Shiite empowerment in Iraq seemed to have had an influence on the organization of the ‘National
Dialogue’ in Saudi Arabia. (SAGER Abdulaziz O, ‘Political Opposition in Saudi Arabia’, in: AARTS Paul
& NONNEMAN Gerd, Saudi Arabia in the Balance: Political Economy, Society, Foreign Affairs, Hurst
& Company, London, 2006, p. 247).
10. The Usuli current, now the dominant doctrine within Imami Shiism, puts the emphasis for coming to
a legal conclusion with the active interpretation of usul al-fiqh (‘basis of jurisprudence’), rather than liter-
ally following of the traditions. Through the revival of Usulism, Shiite clerics were to exercise greater
influence, and Shiism became a more dynamic system, able to react to the realities of the time. (COLE
Juan, Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi’ite Islam, I.B. Tauris, London,
2002, p. 77; MOMEN Moojan, An Introduction to Shi’i Islam, Yale University Press, New Haven &
London, 1985, p. 223).
11. NAKASH Yitzhak, The Shi’is of Iraq, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1995, p. 49. Both al-
Afghani and `Abduh were staunch advocates of pan-Islamism and the unity of the umma against the then
rising influence of the West. To `Abduh, one of the reasons of the stagnation of the Islamic World was
according to them a consequence of the (Sunni) emphasis on taqlid (‘Tradition’). (Encyclopedia of the
Modern Islamic World, ‘Afghani, Jamal al-Din al-’, (KEDDIE Nikki); ibid., ‘`Abduh, Muhammad’,
(CRAGG Kenneth).
12. NAKASH Yitzhak, The Shi’is of Iraq, p. 49.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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shoot. This current, originating from Karbala, was an important supporter of
Imam Khomeini since his days in Najaf, and would actively export the Iranian
Revolution during the 1980s. Shiite militancy therefore has its roots within a
dynamic between the religious centers of what is today’s Iraq and Iran, as a
model for Shiite activism in the Middle East region. The Iranian Revolution and
the echoes it caused in the years after, is therefore to be seen as a pinnacle of a
Shiite emancipation movement, not as the beginning of it.
When looking at the present situation, different aspects seem to run across the
approach of a coordinated or concerted rise of Shiite forces. First of all, in the
debate on confessional opposition, there is too little attention for the nuanced
situation on the ground, for the very diverse nature of the Muslim World. Tribal,
familial, ethnic or national identity plays a considerable role, and often these
identities prevail above religious and confessional ones, sometimes resulting in
conflicts within one Islamic current or loyalty over the borders of Sunni or Shi`a
identity13.
The transnational system of Shiite religious and political thinking is not to be
seen as a monolithic bloc either. There are different levels of Shiite political
activism or national inclusion per country. One marja` at-taqlid (‘source of emu-
lation’; the highest religious scholar within Imami Shiism) differs from the other
in matters of political activism or in how he sees the role of the clergy within the
State. The most popular marja` of the moment is `Ali Sistani of Najaf, who is
seen as being a ‘quietist’, keeping himself far from active political involvement.
On the other hand, the Iranian Supreme Leader, `Ali Khamana´i is seen as the
complete opposite, being the highest representative of the Iranian wilayat-i faqih
(‘Ruling of the Jurisprudent’) doctrine. These Maraji` can be focused on giving
guidance to their community inside a national context, and are widely followed
abroad at the same time (eg. grand ayatollah Muhammad Hussayn Fadl Allah
of Lebanon). In some case, international standing can support national interest.
This is the case of grand ayatollah Muntaziri (d. 2009), who knew a large fol-
lowing, had always outspoken critique on the official Iranian interpretation of
the wilayat-i faqih and played an important symbolic role in the Iranian reform-
ist movement. These different opinions do not only draw lines of division within
Shiite ideology, at the same time they can be considered as the motor for political
13. An illustrious example of this dimension is the confrontation between the Jaysh al-Mahdi of Muqtada
as-Sadr and SCIRI, two Shiite Islamist groupings, contesting each other’s sphere of influence in 2006-
2007. Not only are both movements dominated by famous clerical families – respectively the as-Sadrs and
the al-Hakims – they both represent different strata of the Iraqi society: sadriya has its followers from the
nation’s Shiite lower class, whereas SCIRI is the party of the wealthier middle class (International Crisis
Group, ‘Shiite Politics in Iraq: The Role of the Supreme Council’, Middle East Report, n°70, 15 Novem-
ber 2007, p. 19).FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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dynamism within the community and a way to cope with an ever changing
society.
1.2. Socio-political struggle and national 
participation
The socio-political raison d’être of most Shiite movements and their focus on
their own national context is perhaps the biggest factor that reveals the limited
extent of religious motivations or the current existence of a larger geopolitical
strategy. This struggle for social promotion is largely the consequence of the
poor economical and social standards of the Shiite population – minority or
majority – in most of their home countries. This element was shown by the
massive Shiite participation in socialist or communist parties throughout the
region in the 1950s-1970s, to see their demands addressed, even if other confes-
sional groups dominated them. But from the second half of the 20th century
onwards, Shiite political activism began to organize itself in a framework of its
own. In spite of a period of direct contestation immediately after the Iranian
Revolution of 1979, these movements evolved towards political participation
and national accommodation, rather than following or serving a transnational
cause, or destabilizing the societies concerned. By considering the following
cases, this political evolution can be illustrated in a more concrete way.
In Iraq, the Shiite community was a majority deprived of political power, first
under the Hashimite monarchy, then under the Ba`th regime. Even the actual
Arabian origin of the Iraqi Shi`a was being disputed under the Nationality Law
of 1924. In 1957-1958 the ad-Da`wa movement was founded, offering a reli-
gious alternative for the Leftist parties in which Shiites traditionally partici-
pated. Its main ideologue, Baqir as-Sadr, vehemently denounced the political
aloofness of Najaf. More than forty years later, in 2003, the movement of
Muqtada as-Sadr rode the same wave of socio-political longing as his preceding
family members did. Muqtada was able to partially draw on the network of his
father Sadiq as-Sadr, which was mainly composed from the poorer circles within
Iraqi society14.
The turning point for State participation – and de facto rule – of the Shiite
majority in Iraq were the general legislative elections of 2005. Grand ayatollah
`Ali Sistani was the driving force behind these general elections, issuing different
fatwa’s in 2003 and 2004, calling the Coalition Provisional Authority and its
constitutional activities illegitimate, since they did not represent the entire of
14. International Crisis Group, ‘Iraq’s Muqtada as-Sadr: Spoiler or Stabiliser?’, Middle East Report, n°55,
11 juli 2006, p. 5.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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Iraqi society15. The different Shiite organizations that came into being during the
past decennia were to take part in the national political scene. The Supreme Coun-
cil for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), founded in 1982 as an opposition
group amongst Iraqi refugees in Iran with Iranian support and training, partici-
pated in a very pragmatic way, and became the most important Shiite party in
Iraq, and still dominates the Ministry of Interior. In a symbolical move to under-
line its own accommodation to the new Iraqi context, the organization dropped
the word ‘Revolution’ from its name (becoming the ‘Islamic Supreme Council in
Iraq’; ISCI) in 2007, and adopted grand ayatollah Sistani as its marja`16.
By taking part in the 2005 elections and eventual participation in the national
government, the movement of Muqtada as-Sadr seemed to follow a comparable
nationalizing dynamic. In 2007, as-Sadr withdrew his 5 ministers, partly in
opposition to the American ‘surge’, and disappeared underground17. In the
2009 provincial elections, different candidates ran with his support, but did not
obtain good results18.
For Lebanon, it was the changing societal reality in the first part of the 20th
century, when local Shiites increased in number, became more urbanized and
shook off the traditional zu`ama system19 by getting directly involved in the
national politics that was on the basis of the Shiite movement. Of great impor-
tance for the Lebanese Shiite movement was the arrival of sayyid Musa as-Sadr
(d. 1978), an Iran-based cleric of Lebanese origin in 1957. His principal goal
was the organization of the marginalized Shiite community, amongst others by
founding the al-Majlis ash-Shi`i al-Islami al-A`la (Higher Shiite Islamic Council)
15. Often, the stance of Sistani and the hawza of Najaf is in general considered as being ‘quietist’. One
has to realize that this political silence does not mean that they are apolitical. Sistani does have a vision on
an Islamic State, but situates the `ulama´ within a consultative context than as actually ruling a nation or
community, like the Iranian wilayat-i faqih prescribes. Through his intervention in the formation of a
post-2003 Iraqi State, Sistani has proven that Shiite maraji` are non-negligible in putting forward a strat-
egy for the region. (VISSER Reidar, ‘Sistani, the United States and Politics in Iraq: from Quietism to
Machiavellianism?’, NUPI Papers, n°700, 2006, p. 14-15).
16. International Crisis Group, ‘Shiite Politics in Iraq: The Role of the Supreme Council’, Middle East
Report, n°70, 15 November 2007, p. 15-16.
17. The Jaysh al-Mahdi was suspended on 28 August 2007, in order to be transformed into a smaller
‘Cultural and Religious Force’, called al-Mumahidun (‘the Straighteners [of the Path]’). Some analysts see
this move as a result of Iranian influence, seeking to bolster the power of the Iraqi al-Maliki government
(RAHIMI Babak, ‘The Mumahidun: Muqtada al-Sadr’s new militia’, Terrorism Monitor, n°6, xvii, 2008
(http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5136).
18. International Crisis Group, ‘Iraq’s Civil War, the Sadrists and the Surge’, Middle East Report, n°72,
2008, p. 3; KATZMAN Kenneth, ‘Iran’s Activities and Influence in Iraq’, CRS Report for Congress
RS22323, 7 April 2009, p. 3-4.
19. A za`im (pl. zu`ama) in the Ottoman context is a political leader whose power is based on a local com-
munity, and is able to keep this support by taking care of the demands of his clients. This client-patron
relation is a personal one. The Lebanese Shiite movement of AMAL represents a more modern form of
the zu`ama, one fitted within the political context, where clients vote for a strongman, thus creating a
minimum of control over this relation [Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, ‘Za`im’, (SHEHADI
Nadim F)].FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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and the Haraka al-Mahrumin (‘Movement of the Deprived’). The latter would
turn out to be the forerunner of the current major Shiite players in Lebanon.
While AMAL (Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya; ‘Lebanese Resistance Battal-
ion’) as the successor of the Haraka al-Mahrumin, grew out to be a political
movement with a more or less secular profile, it was Hezbollah that continued
as the Shiite Islamist organization in Lebanon. The conception of Hezbollah is
believed to partially come forth from a disenfranchised part of AMAL, organ-
ized and supported by Iran and elements from ad-Da`wa20.
The Lebanese reality after the Civil War (1975-1991) forced the former militant
groupings to adapt to the national political theatre. AMAL demilitarized after
the Ta`if Agreements in 1989. The party represents for a lot of Lebanese the new
zu`ama: a local network of clients, outside the context of family relations. Hez-
bollah on the other side, choose in the framework of its famous 1992 Infitah
(‘opening up’), to insert itself into the national politics and to tone down its own
militant and revolutionary character. Figurehead of this new course was the
popular secretary-general Hassan Nasr Allah. Despite this apparent transforma-
tion in approach, the military element of the organization remained at its heart
ever since, even after the retreat of Israel in 2000, and was the actual cause for
the sectarian clashes in the Western Suburbs of Beirut in 200821. Apart from
that, Hezbollah controls extensive social initiatives in the south of Lebanon,
addressing the various needs of Shiites in the region. This element is not excep-
tional, since AMAL and the network of grand ayatollah Fadl Allah undertake
the same projects. Hezbollah, however, does not only have to rely on its own
religious resources, it can also bend for a large part on Iranian money.
As the Sunni-Shi`a opposition within the Gulf was more influenced at the start
by the evolutions in Iran in 1979, a development made clear by the emergence
of different insurgent groups, eventually it would not contest its own national
belonging or even the legitimacy of the ruling elite. Violent actions undertaken
by the national Shiite minorities were first of all a demand for authentic political
rights and social promotion. Later these conflicts escalated due to the economic
climate and the oil prizes in the 1990s22.
20. NORTON August Richard, Hezbollah: a short history, Princeton University Press, 2007, p. 32
21. International Crisis Group, ‘Hezbollah’s Weapons turn Inward’, Middle East Report, n°23, 2008, p.
12.
22. BAHRY Louay, ‘The Socioeconomic Foundations of the Shiite Opposition in Bahrain’, Mediterranean
Quarterly, n°11, iii, 2000, p. 137; The exceptions amongst the Shiite movement within a national context
were the Hizb Allah al-Hijaz in Saudi Arabia and Hizb Allah al-Bahrayn in Bahrain, who were rounded
up in respectively 1987 and 1996. These groupings were accused of having ties with and receiving mate-
rial support from the Iranian regime, and of planning to overthrow their respective governments. The
Hizb Allah al-Hijaz was even suspected of having undertaken the attacks on the Khobar Towers in 1996.
Whatever the truth was behind these organizations, these accusations were fully used to divide the grow-
ing Shiite opposition.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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In Bahrain, Shiites form a majority of 70% that long since demand a part in
national politics, a sphere dominated by the Sunni family of Al Khalifa, the
historical Sunni leaders of the island. Discriminatory policies of the ruling clan
triggered violent confrontations in the 1990s and as recently as 200823. In Saudi
Arabia, where Shiites make up about 10% of the population, Shiite militantism
emerged as a call for basic citizen rights denied by the Wahhabi regime. For the
Saudi government, their Shiites form an important strategic domestic element
since the area where most of them live, the province of ash-Sharqiya, contains a
large part of the kingdom’s vast oil reserves. The social struggle that Shiites
undertook as employees of ARAMCO in the 1950s was a major boost in their
future activism24. Decisive moment was the Intifada of Muharram 1400, when
Shiites took the streets to publicly celebrate `Ashura25.
The Shiite movement in both countries has obtained some result, however. In
Bahrain, emir Hamdan Al Khalifa initiated the ‘National Action Charter’, which
introduced a bi-cameral government system and abolished the repressive ‘State
Security Law’. It was only in 2006 that the Shiite organization al-Wifaq was to
participate in the National elections, obtaining 18 of the 40 seats in the Majlis
an-Nawwab (‘Council of Deputies’). In Saudi Arabia, then Crown Prince `Abd
Allah organized the ‘National Dialogue’, of which meetings are held every year,
giving more religious rights to the Saudi Shiites and even providing municipal
elections. Hassan as-Saffar, up to the present considered as the most important
Shiite cleric, originated from militant Shiraziya milieus (cf. supra), exporting the
Iranian Revolution in the 1980s, but changed the profile of his engagement to a
less revolutionary one during the 1990s, even switching to the marja`iya of Sis-
tani after the death of Muhammad ash-Shirazi in 2001. For both countries,
23. ‘Bahrain TV airs terror plot confessions’, International Herald Tribune, 28 December 2008; ‘Muwa-
jahat `anifa fi’l-Bahrayn li’l-yawm ath-thalith `ala khalafiya i`tiqal nushata´ shi`a’, ash-Sharq al-Awsat, 30
January 2009; ‘Bahrain King Pardons Shiite Political Prisoners’, The New York Times, 13 April 2009.
24. Although at the start ARAMCO was and is to be considered as a positive element in the emancipation
of the local Shiite community, poor working conditions, limited chances for promotion and lack of access
to the oil gains quickly added to the already living frustrations of the Shiite minority. Due to the forma-
tion of worker’s unions and the emergence of a Shiite Leftist movement in the 1950s, the distrust of the
Saudi Government and ARMCO towards the Shiite employees was on the rise. The Iranian Revolution in
1979 and the intifada of that year marked the final schism between the two parties, and the definitive
sidelining of Shiites as a work force (LOUËR Laurence, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Politi-
cal Networks in the Gulf, Hurst & Company, London, 2008, pp. 40-44).
25. The riots in ash-Sharqiya inspired by the Iranian Revolution of 1979, quickly gained an iconic status.
`Ashura, the 10th day of the Islamic month of Muharram, in which the martyrdom of Imam Hussayn is
remembered, is usually celebrated with processions, thus becoming one of the events during which the
Shiite identity is very much accentuated. Only after the National Dialogue of 2003, Saudi Shiites were
able to publicly perform this ritual in Shi`a majority parts of the kingdom (SAGER Abdulaziz O., Political
Opposition in Saudi Arabia’, p. 247; JONES Toby Craig, ‘Rebellion in the Saudi Periphery’, International
Journal for Middle East Studies, n°38, 2006, p. 222-227).FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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however, reform does not seem to reach far enough, as reoccurring protests26
seems to prove. For Saudi Arabia, a 2009 Human Rights Watch Report criti-
cized this failure of implementing changes for its Shiite citizens27. The lengthy
search for emancipation, and the limited results the Shiite movement in the Gulf
has obtained until now, has the risk of pushing them into the arms of more
radical tendencies28.
Kuwait, often portrayed as a societal model for the Gulf region, saw its portion
of Shiite contestation in the wake of the First Gulf War, when Iraq put pressure
on the Al Sabah to crack down on Iraqi dissidents and the following rise in oil
prices during the 1990s. The otherwise good relationship between the Shiite
commercial elite and the ruling Al Sabah deteriorated. It was only after the Sec-
ond Gulf War, in 1991, that the trust between both parties was restored. Sunni-
Shi`a differences now mostly play a role on a political level29.
When considering all these elements, we have to conclude that the Shiite move-
ment is too diversified to talk about one coordinated phenomenon. The com-
mon denominator, however, is it origins as a socio-political drive. The Shiite
movement evolved and adapted itself to a national reality, notwithstanding a
more revolutionary intermezzo during the 1980s. As such, the success of Shiite
militancy can be seen as a consequence of the demise of the Ottoman Empire
and the end of colonialism in the region. Due to the formation of States, Shiites
were not only faced with a minority position within the Middle East as a whole,
26. In Bahrain, protests against the prevailing social conditions were held in 2005, and in 2008. As for
Saudi Arabia, severe disturbances appeared in February 2009 in the neighborhood of the cemetery of al-
Baqi` in Medina, where different Imams are buried. (‘Muwajahat `anifa fi’l-Bahrayn li’l-yawm ath-thalith
`ala khalafiya i`tiqal nushata´ shi`a’, ash-Sharq al-Awsat, 30 January 2009; ‘Ghadab Shi`i fi as-Sa`udiya
ba`d ishtibakat bi’l-Madina al-Munawwara’, al-Quds al-`Arabi, 25 February 2009; ‘Tazahirat bi’l-mint-
aqat ash-Sharqiya fi as-Sa`udiya .. Wa ‘s-Saffar yantaqad mawqif al-hukuma wa yutalib al-malik bi’t-
tadakhkhul’, al-Quds al-`Arabi, 26 February 2009; cf infra).
27. Human Rights Watch, Denied Dignity: Systematic Discrimination and Hostility towards Saudi Shia
Citizens, September 2009, pp. 27 (http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/saudi0909web.pdf; con-
sulted on 30 October 2009).
28. An example of this radicalism is the secessionist rhetoric of the radical Shiite shaykh Nimr an-Nimr,
who threatened secession of the ash-Sharqiya province after the Intifada al-Baqi`. On the website of the
Shabaka ad-Difa` `an Shaykh an-Nimr, a communiqué was published on 10 May 2009, in which the
‘Birth of the Arab Republic of the East in the region van al-Ihsa and al-Qatif’ was announced. The capital
of the new nation, that was not only limited to the East of Saudi Arabia but ran across the borders of the
Southern part of the country as well, would become al-`Ammawiya, home town of shaykh Nimr an-Nimr.
The writer emphasized that the initiative came from the Saudi Shiites themselves, not by foreign actors. A
message like this is quite insignificant and marginal within the Saudi Shiite movement, but proves the
presence of separatist tendencies in some pockets of the country, like the city of `Ammawiya.
(www.alnamer.co.cc/print.php?action=print&m=newsm&id=188 [Arabic], consulted on 14 May 2009,
the website is currently offline).
29. The most recent of these incidents was the entry of an Iranian cleric into the country, despite security
concerns (‘al-Kuwayt: al-milaff at-ta´ifi yutafajjir mujaddadan ba`da dukhul rajul din shi`i ila al-bilad’,
ash-Sharq al-Awsat, 15 November 2008).FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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but in some instances within a national context as well. It is in this environment
that Shiites were starting to claim their position within their country, thereby
looking at the example of transnational Shiite structures.
Thus, one cannot speak about a change in Sunni-Shiite power balance, if not
only because of the limited overall number of the Shiites in the Muslim World.
It is the search of the Shiite minority for a larger involvement in its national
politics that is taking form, not a structured, region spanning attempt to take
over power from the Sunni majority.
Notwithstanding this, the transnational character of the Shiite movement
remains an element that is not to be neglected, as we have stated previously. It
plays a role in the ideological or political orientation of the different actors,
within their respective national contexts, and can ultimately grant legitimacy to
Shiite actors taking part in the national political game. It is on this national level
that different religious approaches meet, and provoke a differentiation of the
political approach, a dynamic in meeting up to the current day and age, and the
challenges involved.
1.3. Iran as the perceived king pin in the regional 
Sunni-Shi`a struggle?
In Iran, the causes of the 1979 Islamic Revolution were the result of a religious-
political movement, protesting against the autocratic tendencies of the Shah’s
regime on the one hand, and – not the least – a huge Western influence in the
country on the other. The doctrine that gave form to the new Iranian State was
the wilayat-i faqih, in which the central power was vested in the person of a
cleric, in this case Imam Ruhollah Khomeini (d. 1989). At the start, this move-
ment was not specifically Shiite, because it appealed to pan-Islamist ideals. The
movement of Khomeini has always shared the same political objectives as Sunni
Islamists; he even adopted a great deal of its ideas from Sunni Islamist thinkers
such as Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad `Abduh and Muhammad Rashid
Rida (d. 1934). It was a struggle against oppression, which the Revolutionary
Movement in Iran shared with these early radical Sunni tendencies, and the sup-
port Iran was to give to the oppressed, formed an important element in the
Iranian constitution. These Khomeinist ideals were in a large degree indebted to
the ideas of Iranian thinkers such as `Ali Shari`ati (d. 1977) or Murtaza Mutah-
hari (d. 1979), who claimed that the struggle against oppression – both on the
level of oppositions within Iran as within the Muslim World or between theFEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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Muslim World and Western imperialism – should be undertaken by a more
activist and militant interpretation of the Shiite religious identity30.
It was in a large part because of the perception raised by Sunni nations within
the Middle East, who feared the success of the Iranian Republic that the Iranian
establishment was to redefine its policy towards a more Shiite-oriented one31.
Nevertheless, Iran would not give up on the Khomeinist pan-Islamic vision.
During the first years after the Islamic Revolution, Iran tried to export its revo-
lutionary ideology in the region by supporting armed groups, such as Hezbollah
or SCIRI. An important actor in this project proved to be the aforementioned
Shiraziya, who were able to build a revolutionary influence in the Gulf (cf.
supra).
From the second half of the 1980s onwards, a major shift would emerge regard-
ing the foreign policy of Iran. In an attempt to transform Iran into a post-revo-
lutionary and manageable society, Khomeini did not only oust elements oppos-
ing his policies, but also radical forces that were supporting Iran’s violent
exports. In 1989, after the First Gulf War and the death of Imam Khomeini, the
politics of Iran changed dramatically, both internally and externally. The new
political and diplomatic strategy of Iran was siyasat-i dast-i gol (‘policy of a
handful of flowers’)32, a more gentle and sophisticated approach, often
described as ‘pragmatic’. An aspect of this became the larger independence of
Iran’s allies to integrate into their respective national context, making them
indispensable for their own country. In this way, Iran could still rely on the
loyalty of those organizations, without using them as proxies33. This element
becomes very clear when we watch the evolution of Hezbollah in Lebanon and
SCIRI/ISCI in Iraq, as both groupings succeed in becoming politically relevant
actors. At the same time, Iranian militant Islamism was still to be exported
throughout the region, but in a more subtle way.
30. DABASHI Hamid, ‘`Ali Shari`ati’, in: NASR Seyyed Hossein & DABASHI Hamid & NASR Seyyed
Vali Reza (eds.), Expectations of the Millennium: Shi’ism in History, State University of New York Press,
New York, 1989, p. 385-386. The universal (Quranic) opposition of mustad`afun (‘oppressed’) against
mustakbirun (‘oppressors’) is implied in Article 3 of the Iranian Constitution (http://www.irancham-
ber.com/government/laws/constitution.php).
31. Article 12 of the Iranian Constitution states that the official religion of Iran was to be Islam of the
Ja`fari School of Law. This article was copied from the time of the constitutional movement and inserted
in the 1979 constitution, partly to counter the power claims of liberal-Islamist groupings (http://
www.iranchamber.com/government/laws/constitution.php; BUCHTA Wilfried, ‘Tehran’s Ecumenical soci-
ety (Majma` al-Taqrib): a veritable ecumenical revival or a Trojan horse of Iran?’, in: BRUNNER Rainer
& ENDE Werner (ed.), The Twelver Shia in Modern Times: Religious Culture & Political History, Brill,
Leiden & Boston & Köln, 2001, p. 333-342).
32. PAHLAVI Pierre, ‘La Place du Chiisme dans la Grande Stratégie Iranienne’, Défence Nationale et
Sécurité Collective, n° 8/9, 2008, p. 44.
33. ROY Olivier, ‘l’Impact de la Révolution Iranienne au Moyen Orient’, in: MERVIN Sabrina (ed.), Les
Mondes Chiites, p. 40-41.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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Under the presidencies of Rafsanjani (1989-1997) and especially Khatami
(1997-2005) the pragmatic approach to foreign policy saw its heydays, with
rapprochement not only towards the West, but also to Arabian countries. In this
way, Iran was steadily trying to fit into the international community, seeing this
as an indispensable step in its search for regional hegemony34. After the attacks
of 11 September 2001 and the consequent removal of the hostile Taliban regime
in Afghanistan and the fall of Saddam Hussayn in 2003, the moment had come
to further implement its strategy of expanding its influence. As a consequence of
this fact, Iran adopted a more assertive profile, enhanced by the military victo-
ries of its Hezbollah allies in Lebanon. At the same time, however, Iran had
become more vulnerable for a future attack due to the larger presence of the US
in the region, and the distrust raised by the traditional ‘Sunni countries’ in the
regions, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, towards the ambitions of Iran35. In
spite of the more radical and confrontational tone handled by the ‘neoconserv-
ative’ administration of Ahmadinajad, not much seems to change in the Iranian
foreign policy36.
Many observers therefore point at Iran as being the center of the recent apparent
rise in the Shiite profile. To a larger extent, this proved to be incorrect. Not only
did Shiite militancy originate – as we saw – in different national contexts, as a
reaction against local social and political problems. The actual influence Iran
has over militant groups such as Hezbollah or ISCI is also very limited, and the
nominal and material support the country offers is of a tactical nature, fitted
into its strategy of regional hegemony37. The relation between Iran and the Shi-
ites of the region is more one of Iran trying to reach out to the different Shiite
movements in the region, in order to fulfill its geostrategic goals, rather than
these movements blindly serving Iran.
At the same time, Iran is still profiling itself as a religious authority, and is reach-
ing out to Shiites worldwide. Its religious dimension has become a channel
through which Iran is promoting its own hegemonic status in the region (we will
go into these mechanisms further on). These instruments of ‘religious promo-
tion’ have known an evolution which runs parallel to the process of power cen-
tralization in Iran, where the the importance of clerical backing within State
34. RAMAZANI R.K., ‘Iran’s Foreign Policy: Independence, Freedom and the Islamic Republic’, in:
EHTESHAMI Anoushiravan & ZWEIRI Mahjoob (eds.), Iran’s Foreign Policy from Khatami to
Ahmadinejad, Ithaca Press, Reading, 2008, p. 9.
35. SABET-SAEIDI Shahriar, ‘Iranian-European Relations: a Strategic Partnership?’, in: EHTESHAMI
Anoushiravan & ZWEIRI Mahjoob (eds.), Iran’s Foreign Policy from Khatami to Ahmadinejad, Ithaca
Press, Reading, 2008, p. 55.
36. EHTESHAMI Anoushiravan & ZWEIRI Mahjoob, Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservatives, I.B.
Tauris, London & New York, 2007, p. 103-107.
37. For instance, see: WEHREY Frederic (et al.), Dangerous but not Omnipotent: exploring the reach and
limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2009, p. 203.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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politics has degraded. While this was made very clear during the 2009 election
unrest, this tendency already stems from the years of Khomeini, who in 1988
introduced the concept of wilayet-i mutlaqa-yi faqih, which grants the Supreme
Leader a greater religious authority, placing his State rulings above the Shari`a38.
Thus more religious power was to be centralized in the person of the Supreme
Leader. After Khomeini’s death and his controversial appointment of Khamana´i
as his successor in 1989, during which he sidelined his first successor Montaziri,
the religious establishment came under even bigger strain. The new Supreme
Leader was practically obliged to take the same road, since he did not have the
same backing from the religious circles, in Iran or abroad, as Khomeini did. As
a consequence, he gradually sought other means of supporting his rule, which
he found in the Sipah-i Pasdaran (‘Revolutionary Guard’) and the Basij (‘Mobi-
lization’, paramilitary organization resorting under the Revolutionary Guard).
At the same time, he tightened his grip over the Iranian clergy in Qom, through
the foundation of different controlling organs and by means of financial sup-
port39.
Iran uses Shiism today mainly as a vehicle for the spread of its regional hegem-
onic ambitions, as a political channel of self-promotion. In this way, the promo-
tion and dissemination of its militant (Shiite) Islamic ideology can exist together
with the different local realities, thus allowing Iran to ride the wave of Shiite
activism, while running parallel with more apolitical interpretations of Shiism,
and keeping in touch or reaching out to Shiite communities throughout the
Islamic World. At the same time, it can try to gain at least some control over the
very amorphous network of the marja`iya, that might run across the regional
political objectives of Iran. So, towards the future Najaf might indeed grow fur-
ther in prominence as a center of religion, for Iran it will only be the political
influence that matters.
At the same time, Iran is trying to keep up a pan-Islamic profile, a premise for
being able to extend its relations and standing within a mostly Sunni Middle
East. Various statements by high-ranking clerics such as ayatollah Rafsanjani
seem to point in this direction40, the Islamic Republic also undertakes or sup-
ports different initiatives of taqrib (‘rapprochement’; cf. infra) between the dif-
38. MARTIN Vanessa, Creating an Islamic State; Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran, I.B. Tauris,
London & New York, 2000, p. 170.
39. KHALAJI Mehdi, ‘The Last Marja: Sistani and the End of Traditional Religious Authority in Shiism’,
Policy Focus, n° 59, September 2006, p. 26-32.
40. ‘Rafsanjani: al-khilafat al-madhhabiya hiya al-waba´ al-`azim alladhy yuhaddad al-`Alam al-Islami’,
al-Quds al-`Arabi, 23 May 2009. See also PAHLAVI Pierre, ‘La Place du Chiisme’, p. 50. It is very impor-
tant to see statements as these by high ranking Iranian officials like Rafsanjani in the context of a current
domestic power struggle, and the role that they want to give themselves in the Iranian establishment.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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ferent currents of Islam. The pan-Islamic nature of the Islamic Revolution stays
at the heart of Iranian foreign policy, not in the least for pragmatic reasons.
All things considered, is Iran really a regional ‘king pin’, steering the Shiite
movement with the goal of dominating the region by proxy? Such a perception
would be all too simplistic. The Shiite socio-political movement knew – as we
have already discussed – a history and development of its own. During the
beginning of the 1980s, Iran did try to export its Islamic Revolution and pan-
islamist ideals by force, but only with limited success. Since the end of the 1980s,
Iranian foreign policy is a pragmatic search for regional influence, adopting a
less confrontational approach. Iran rather rides the wave of the Shiite move-
ment, than that this Shiite movement is directed by Iran. As we will see in the
next paragraph, by promoting Shiism of the ‘Iranian brand’ and by associating
itself with the universal ideas of social promotion and fighting oppression, Iran
is trying to give form to its plan of enhanced regional influence.
1.4. Europe, Belgium and the Sunni-Shia opposition 
within the Middle East
By now, it might be useful to make some observations and formulate recommen-
dations on how to approach the Sunni-Shi`a paradigm within the Middle East
itself.
On a policy level, the Sunni-Shi`a controversy does not seem to be an issue for
the EU, nor for Belgium. In specific cases, for example in European efforts in the
Middle East peace process, the specter of a regional Shi`a take-over and the
subsequent reluctance of policy makers or EU Member States to involve the
supposed proxies of Iran (Hezbollah, Hamas) into the search for solutions often
hinder the creation of a feasible policy for the region.
Renewed political and economical relations with Iran have always been an
appealing possibility for the EU and Belgium, certainly given the fact that it is
the most important trade partner to the Islamic Republic41. At different
moments, Europe showed unwillingness to subscribe to the more confronta-
tional approach of the US. From the Iranian side, there was a major move
towards Europe after the 11 September attacks, since the country was more and
41. Even under the current nuclear file, trade between Iran and the EU continues. In 2008, 26.7% of Iran’s
import came from the EU. Iran has the second greatest gas reserves and the third largest oil reserves. (‘Iran’,
CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html, consulted
on 19 November 2009; http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113392.pdf, con-
sulted on 16 October 2009).FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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more becoming a possible target for United States military interventions42. The
deepening of the political and economic ties has been stalled since the revelation
of the Iranian nuclear efforts in 2002.
Nevertheless, the EU seems to be aware of the possibilities lying in normalized
relations with Iran, not in the least on a geopolitical and geostrategic level.
Europe will have to be aware of the hegemonic aspirations of Iran, and the
eventual problems involved with the threatened strategic position of its classical
allies in the region, such as Egypt or Saudi Arabia. This might give an indication
why the recent nervousness in the traditionally ‘Sunni’ regime countries is
mounting, fearing the loss of their own strategic role within the region (cf.
infra).
The power that Iran is able to exert in Iraqi politics is substantial, but must (?)
not be overestimated. Here we can also indicate that the relations between the
Islamic Republic and ISCI are confined to a more tactical, ad hoc nature. The
specter of an Iranian-Iraqi alliance and the regional weight of both countries
play a bigger role than the fear for a ‘Shiite Crescent’. However the EU plays
more or less second fiddle in Iraq since the US invasion of 2003, it should not
question its support for State building to the current and future government, and
initiatives such as EUJUST LEX training of officials will prove helpful. Europe
has to remain supportive of the democratic process, involving the entire range
of Iraqi ethnic and religious actors. One has to keep in mind that relations
between the Iraqi establishment and Iran still are very close, as proven by the
operations against militants of Iranian opposition group Mujahidin-i Khalq in
the camp of al-Ashraf43.
In Lebanon, Belgium and the EU adopt a position towards Hezbollah that
appears to be ambiguous. Unlike the United States for example, who consider
this organization as being a terrorist group, the EU does maintain contacts with
what is described as the ‘political wing’ of Hezbollah. Most recently, in June
2009, high representative Javier Solana met with one of the MP’s of the group-
ing, much to the dismay of the Israeli government. The meeting, that took place
in the context of the 2009 national elections, in which the March 8 Alliance lost,
was meant to promote a pluralist approach in Lebanese politics, and a stabiliza-
tion of the Lebanese situation in a non-militarist way44. But the Lebanese reality
is that Hezbollah sees its own armed status as its core business, and as being
inseparable from political activities. A proof of this emerged in 2008 when Hez-
42. SABET-SAEIDI Shahriar, ‘Iranian-European Relations’, p. 55.
43. The armed activists were allegedly resisting the creation of a police station in the camp (‘Iraqi forces
raid Iran exile camp’, BBC News, 29 July 2009 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8173676.stm).
44. Interview with EU Council official, 15 October 2009.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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bollah came to clash with Sunnis in the western part of the suburb of Beirut. The
cause for this was the attempt by the 14 March alliance to sack the Hezbollahi
head of securtiy at Beirut International Airport and to dismantle the parallel
communication network used for the military operations of this group.
The most important element in the Belgian and EU security policy that can be
affected by the Sunni-Shi`a opposition appears to be the UNIFIL mission in Leb-
anon, in which the EU augmented its contribution under resolution 1701, after
the Summer War of 2006. The most imminent danger for Belgian troops sta-
tioned in the South of Lebanon will not so much be posed by the presence of
Hezbollah elements itself. The biggest actual threat comes from the possibility
of renewed fighting between Israeli armed forces and the Lebanese Hezbollah,
in which case the Belgian troops can get caught between both fighting parties.
A second one is formed by terrorist attacks by jihadist movements residing in
the Palestinian refugee camps in the north of the country45.
The Gulf is of great strategic importance46 for the European Union, since 70%
of the oil import comes from the GCC countries. Of the GCC, two countries
have an unstable political situation, with a sectarian edge, namely Saudi Arabia
and Bahrain. The EU approach for the region is – as before – one of emphasizing
human rights. Basically, this should prove to be a fertile one, seeing the fact that
the Sunni – Shi`a controversy in the region has a lot to do with demanding cor-
rect political representation and more equal rights. The EU, however, has only
the means to encourage the Gulf countries and the GCC to respect these rights,
not to impose it on them. While the EU correctly realizes the contra productive-
ness of such an approach, it should be aware of the limitedness of such a stance.
There have been initiatives from regional governments in the past to reach out
to their Shiite citizens, and it often proved to be a mere nominal reform. The best
example in this case is the Saudi ‘National Dialogue’, that was to promote the
national situation of Saudi Shiites. The Human Rights Watch report mentioned
above proved the prevailing discrimination of the Shiite minority.
45. In 2007, six Spanish UNIFIL peacekeepers died during an attack by al-Qa`ida-inspired militants.
(ABDEL-LATIF Omayma, ‘Lebanon’s Sunni Islamists – a growing force’, Carnegie Papers, n°6, 2008, pp.
22).
46. A more tangible example of the interests involved in the Gulf situation is the opening of a French
naval base in the Arab Emirates. As a mere national initiative, the objective of this action was the support
of French allies in the region, as well as guaranteeing security and stability in the region. In an official
communiqué, the French authorities stated not to rule out the deployment of nuclear weapons in its new
base (‘France opens UAE military base’, al-Jazeera English, 26 May 2009 (http://english.aljazeera.net);
‘Moyen-Orient: la France se donne les moyens de riposter’, Le Figaro, 15 June 2009; two months later,
US secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that the US is ready to extend military support for its allies in
the Gulf, to counter an Iranian nuclear threat (‘US mulls Gulf defences against Iran’, al-Jazeera English,
22 July 2009 (http://english.aljazeera.net)).FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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End of 2009, the most acute threat to regional security seems to come from the
situation in Yemen, where a five-year-old conflict between the northern al-Huthi
rebels (a Zaydi Shiite grouping) and the Yemeni central government seems to
escalate. At the basis of the conflict lies the economically neglected status of the
Sa`da province, but the Saleh administration claims material support of Iran for
the insurgents, and thus places the conflict in a wider confessional context47.
The EU already expressed her concern for the situation, urging the end of hos-
tilities and stressed on the need for a stable and unified Yemen48. The biggest
danger of the conflict lies mostly in the possibility of a spillover to Saudi Arabia,
which already undertook military interventions at the Yemeni border, and the
entire peninsula49. Although the conflict is more and more placed within the
struggle of Sunnism against Shiism, and an Iranian quest for geostrategical
power, the al-Huthi movement rejects government accusations of wanting to
revive the in 1962 abolished Zaydi imamate in North Yemen, and gives socio-
economical reasons for their struggle.
47. Until November 2009, no actual evidence was given for the allegations of Iranian support. The
Islamic Republic officially supports the unity of Yemen and denies involvement (‘Larijani yu´akid da`m
Iran al-qawi li wahda al-Yaman’, al-Quds al-`Arabi, 15 May 2009).
48. Council of the European Union, ‘Council conclusions on Yemen: 2971st External Relations Council meet-
ing’, 27 October 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/yemen/docs/2009_joint_communique_en.pdf.
49. ‘Saudi jets bomb Yemeni Houthis’, al-Jazeera English, 5 November 2009 (http://english.aljazeera.net).FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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2. Sunni-Shiite relations and the politics of 
religion
The first part of this paper focused on the developments within the Middle East-
ern Shiite community, what the limitations are of a ‘Shiite Crescent’-approach
and what the role of Iran in this construction. In part two, we will take a closer
look at how religious identities are becoming the object of political instrumen-
talization, how regional power play lies behind a more outspoken distrust
towards Shiism, and how the claims and fears over Shiite proselytism fit into this
controversy. At the end, we will consider the eventual points of concern for EU
and Belgian internal security policies.
2.1. The instrumentalization of Sunni-Shi`a relations 
in the Middle East
From bitter enmity to ‘business as usual’
Within the more radical Islamic tendencies, Wahhabism50 can be considered as
one of the ideological currents most hostile towards Shiite, basing its arguments
on the writings of Muhammad Ibn al-Wahhab (d. 1792) and the Hanbali school
of law51. Laying an overall emphasis on tawhid (‘Unity [of God]’) it considers
the Shiite practices of grave visiting as alien to Islam, and the special status of
the Imams is a thorn in the eye. Shiites are systematically called rafida (‘they who
refuse [the first Righteous Caliphs]’), are considered mushrikun (‘polytheists’)
and therefore unbelievers. One of the most recent major declarations made in
this context was the takfir (‘charge of heresy’) by shaykh `Adil al-Kalabani dur-
50. Wahhabism, the movement following the religious doctrine of Muhammad ibn `Abd al-Wahhab (d.
1792), is until the present day the official interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia. The Wahhabi clerical
circles, referred to as the Al Shaykh, provide the Saudi royal family with the necessary religious legiti-
macy. In Saudi recent history, different attempts have been made to suppress the Shiite identity or even to
make it fade away (EI², Wahhabiyya, (PESKES Esther & ENDE W.); NAKASH Yitzhak, Reaching for
Power: the Shi`a in the Modern Arab World, Princeton University Press, Princeton & Oxford, 2006, p.
46); The Wahhabi trend that draws an anti-Shiite picture in the psychological warfare against the Islamic
Republic of Iran, under the influence of the Saudi government, is often called ‘Neo-Wahhabism’. Their
activities, however, never seem to surpass mere rhetoric (HASSON Isaac, ‘Les Shiites vues par les Néo-
Wahhabites, Arabica, n°53, iii, 2006, p. 30).
51. DELONG-BAS Natana J., Wahhabi Islam: from revival and reform to global jihad, AUC Press, Cairo,
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ing a BBC television broadcast on 2 May 2009, following the Intifada al-Baqi`52
in February of the same year. In this statement, he declared the Shiite `ulama´
infidel because of their view on the Companions of the Prophet, and said that
the Shiites already enjoyed enough rights53.
Although this ideology already originated beginning of the 19th century, it
gained great momentum after the Iranian Revolution, when different Arabic
States came under the influence of Saudi Arabia, and in this way receiving Wah-
habi influence on their own territory54. It is against this background that we
have to see the emergence of a Wahhabi anti-Shi`a literature, which overall tries
to place Shiites and Shiite activism outside the Arab and Islamic identity. Often
it bluntly identifies Shiism with Iran and Persian heritage: all Shiites are only
loyal to Iran and Shiism itself stems from non-Islamic roots. Moreover, they are
accused of working to revive the glory of Safavid Iran, by undermining the
umma, and by working together with Israel and the US55. This literature has
been used and quoted in different Wahhabi inspired discourses, and knows a
great dissemination over the Internet, on anti-Shiite websites or discussion
forums56.
52. In February 2009, riots broke out in the city of Medina. The direct cause was the filming of female
pilgrims while praying by security forces. The result was a violent conflict between Saudi religious police,
civilians and Saudi Shiites from ash-Sharqiya. (‘Muwajahat `anifa fi’l-Bahrayn li’l-yawm ath-thalith `ala
khalafiya i`tiqal nushata´ shi`a’, ash-Sharq al-Awsat, 30 January 2009; ‘Ghadab Shi`i fi as-Sa`udiya ba`d
ishtibakat bi’l-Madina al-Munawwara’, al-Quds al-`Arabi, 25 February 2009; ‘Tazahirat bi’l-mintaqat
ash-Sharqiya fi as-Sa`udiya .. Wa ‘s-Saffar yantaqad mawqif al-hukuma wa yutalib al-malik bi’t-tada-
khkhul’, al-Quds al-`Arabi, 26 February 2009).
53. In this way, he clearly criticized the National Dialogue initiative, organized by the Al Sa`ud. The dis-
puted broadcast is available on: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_TytRBiZaxI&feature=PlayL-
ist&p=33FE9A72C00EF1A4&playnext=1&playnext_from=PL&index=2 [Arabic], consulted on 30
October 2009). In the days after, not only Saudi Shiite clerics uttered their protest, and asked the King to
sack the Imam al-Haram, the Iraqi government and the Iranian Supreme Leader demanded apologies
from al-Kalabani and condemned these statements as creating splits in the Muslim World. On 10 July, al-
Kalabani renewed his takfir. (‘`Ulama´ Shi`a yad`un li iqala imam al-haram aw i`tidhar `an takfirihi
lahumm’, al-Quds al-`Arabi, 11 May 2009; ‘Khamana´i yuhajim al-Wahhabiya wa yutahhimuha bi tan-
fidh mukhattat al-tafriqa bayn al-muslimin’, Rasid, 14 May 2009 (www.rasid.com/print.php?id=29005,
consulted on 14 May 2009); ‘Imam al-Haram yujaddid takfirahu li’sh-Shi`a wa yanfi ta`arrudahu li ´ayy
tadyiq aw istid`a´ min as-salatat’, al-Quds al-`Arabi, 11 June 2009).
54. DELONG-BAS Natana J., Wahhabi Islam, p. 84-91.
55. One of the most important examples of such literature is ‘Wa Ja´ Dawr al-Majus’ (‘Then it was the
Magi’s turn’) written by a certain dr. `Abd Allah Muhammad al-Gharib in 1980. The work describes in a
pseudo-scientific way the Shi`a as a fifth column within Islam, locates the origins of the Shiite movement
within an Iranian Jewish-Christian-Zoroastrian conundrum, wanting to restore the Safavi Empire, while
conspiring with Israel and America to achieve this goal. The text does not proclaim the takfir on the Shi-
ites, however. (The text is available on the anti-Shiite website ad-Difa` `an as-Sunna: http://www.dd-sun-
nah.net/records/view/action/view/id/113/ [Arabic]). Although the work uses a complete different method,
approach and vocabulary, the ideas articulated in this work are still widely used by Salafi apologetics. (See
also KAZIMI Nabras, ‘Zarqawi’s Anti-Shi`a Legacy’, p. 56-58).
56. Material such as this is easily downloaded from anti-Shiite websites such as ad-Difa` `an as-Sunna
(http://www.dd-sunnah.net/), Faysal Nur, (http://www.fnoor.com/) or al-Bayna (http://albainah.net/).FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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Wahhabi and Salafi57 inspired groupings who adopt a radical or militant view
on the idea of jihad can form a direct threat to Shiite communities; the most
known examples in this regard are without doubt the activities of Abu Mus`ab
az-Zarqawi (d. 2006) in Iraq. The outspoken view on Shiism as a form of kufr
(‘heresy’) is, albeit more spread during the last decades, still a minority position.
With the debate on Sunni-Shi`a relations raging amongst observers, one would
easily forget that until recently, confessional affiliation or being Shiite was not
an issue at all. In the Muslim streets, people were often unaware of the meaning
of Shiism, and in so-called ‘Sunni’ countries as Egypt, both branches of Islam
lived next to each other without any problem at all. The presence of a confes-
sional Islam, with Sufi influences, in some way promoted this coexistence, in
which Sunni and Shiite elements overlap (eg. visiting shrines, celebrating mulids
(‘Birthday’) of Sufi saints, or of the Prophet himself). Some observers point out
that this confessional Islam is losing more and more appeal, with Sunnis turning
towards a more ‘mainstream’ form of Sunnism. We can wonder in this regard if
the public opinion of the average Sunni Muslim is in possible danger of getting
more polarized.
In recent history, the Muslim world also witnessed different initiatives to bring
both branches closer together. In 1946, well before there was an Islamic Repub-
lic, Iranian clerics founded the Jama`a at-Taqrib bayna ‘l-Madhahib (‘Organiza-
tion for the Rapprochement between the Schools of Law’) in Cairo58. In 1959,
the Jama`a at-Taqrib reached its greatest result when shaykh al-Azhar Mahmud
Shaltut (d. 1963) issued a fatwa recognizing Shiism as a fifth Islamic school of
law. At the end of the 1970s, the activities of this institution ended: the Islamic
Revolution took away the last Sunni enthusiasm for taqrib. In 1990, the Iranian
regime under Khamana´i founded a successor to the Jama`a at-Taqrib, in the
framework of its new, pragmatic Foreign Policy and the pan-Islamist ideal of the
Revolution: al-Majma` al-`Alami li ‘t-Taqrib bayn al-Madhahib al-Islamiya59
(‘World Association for Rapprochement between the Islamic Schools of Law’),
stationed in Tehran. Its activities are more or less the same as those of its pred-
ecessor: publication of the Risala at-Taqrib periodical, transsectarian education,
and the organization of seminaries and conferences on Islamic unity. Outside
Iran however, the Muslim World is considerably less enthusiastic, and consid-
57. As the usage of the term ‘Salafist’ or Salafiya is somewhat problematic; in this paper we will use the
concept salafiya as a reference to the body of Islamic currents, ‘aiming to regenerate Islam by a return to
the tradition represented by the pious forefathers’ (as-salaf as-salih; EI², ‘Salafiyya’, (ENDE Werner)).
58. The driving force behind it was the Iranian shaykh Muhammad Taqi Qummi. The goal of the initia-
tive was bringing Shiism and Sunnism closer to one another, and having the former recognized as a Ja`fari
madhhab. One of its core activities was the publication of Risala al-Islam (‘Message of Islam’), an inter-
faith periodical.
59. On the website of the Majma` at-Taqrib (www.taghrib.org) one can still consult the issues of the
former Risala al-Islam, next to the current Risala at-Taqrib.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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ered the initiative as a tool of the Iranian search for hegemony60. In 2005, King
`Abd Allah II of Jordan organized the Risala `Amman (‘Amman Message’). In
this initiative, the most influential Muslim clerics recognized the different inter-
pretations of Islam, and forbade takfir amongst Muslims61.
But even within Sunni Islamist circles, distrust appears to become greater. When
we take the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as an example, it does not seem to
take an outspoken stance in the Sunni-Shi`a controversy62, not even in the Egyp-
tian ‘Hezbollah controversy’ of April 2009. But if we look at the discourse of
one of its more known exponents, shaykh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, we can see cracks
appearing in the non-sectarian stance of the Brotherhood. On the one hand, the
shaykh took part in many initiatives of taqrib, such as the recent Risala
`Amman. On the other, he has on many occasions expressed his concern about
the growing Shiite presence and visibility in mostly Sunni countries, and his
absolute rejection of this Shiite ‘infiltration’ or proselytism. Shaykh Yusuf al-
Qaradawi63 ventilated this position at the Opening Speech of the 13th Confer-
ence for Islamic Research at al-Azhar:
“Iran is twofold: the nation and the madhhab [‘doctrine’]. We keep on
supporting and defending the nation [...]. The madhhab Iran and the
attempts of conversion that take place behind it, we reject. We are part of
Sunnism, and we believe that we are in our right”. [...] “We do not want
to be converted to Shiism, at the same degree that we do not want to
convert Shiites to Sunnites. From this point of view, we reject any Shiite
infiltration in the lands of Sunnism”64.
60. BAR Shmuel, ‘Sunnis and Shiites – Between Rapprochement and Conflict’, Current Trends in Islamist
Ideology, n°2, 2005, p.89; BUCHTA Wilfried, ‘Tehran’s Ecumenical Society’, p. 333-342.
61. Amongst the participants of the Risala al-Islam were Yusuf al-Qaradawi, `Ali Sistani and `Ali
Khamana´i (see also http://ammanmessage.com/).
62. The Muslim Brotherhood largely stresses on the unity of the umma, and the understanding amongst
Muslim believers. For example, the General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Muhammad Sharif,
clearly emphasized the need for mutual understanding between Sunnism and Shiism during the al-Jazeera
TV programme ‘al-Hiwar al-Maftuh’ on 6 March 2004 (www.ikhwanonline.com/print.asp?ArtID=5267
&SecID=210 [Arabic]; consulted on 19 November 2009).
63. Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a follower of Hassan al-Banna and member of the Muslim Brotherhood, stands
for a moderate, conservative Islam. By making use of modern means of communication, al-Qaradawi has
obtained a huge visibility in the entire world (Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, ‘Qaradawi,
Yusuf al-, (MANDAVILLE Peter).
64. ‘al-Qaradawi: Qadiya al-Bashir bi Haja li Waqfa `Arabiya, La Ziyarat’, IUMS Online  (http://
www.iumsonline.net), 12 March 2009 [Arabic]. Similar statements have occurred on 25 January 2009
when a member of the General Guide’s bureau, dr. Mahmud Ghazlan, used largely the same arguments as
al-Qaradawi. The man lauded the ideological aspect of the Iranian political project, and repeated the
aloofness of the Muslim Brotherhood in the sectarian issue as well as the respect for their Shiite co-reli-
gionists. He criticized the confrontational language used by Iran, and warned that the Brotherhood would
no stay on the sidelines, and intervene by informing the Sunni community on the true details of this threat
to the unity of the umma (http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=45768&SecID=0 [Arabic],
consulted on 30 November 2009). The General Guide himself stressed in a message following on dr. Mah-
mud Ghazlan’s statement that this is his opinion, not the one of the Brotherhood as a whole, (http://
www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=48149&SecID=0 [Arabic], consulted on 30 November 2009).FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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The distrust of clerics such as al-Qaradawi towards the ‘madhhab Iran’ can be
seen as a product of the Iranian search for hegemony65. These elements support
the regional efforts made by Iran and its loyalists against Israel and the West,
because this is a goal that runs parallel with their own ambitions. They do not,
however, tolerate the spread of political Islamic thought of Iranian signature in
the traditional Sunni Islamist sphere of influence.
It would be very interesting to conduct further study on the question why
exactly Sunni actors as al-Qaradawi actually would fear losing territory to an
Islamic political current associated with Iran. Perhaps the universal revolution-
ary idea of the struggle of mustad`afun (‘oppressed’) against mustakbirun
(‘oppressors’), the more inclusive character of Iranian style Islamism and the
disenfranchisement of Sunni Arabs with how their government fails to tackle
regional issues, add up these Sunni concerns. While all this remains speculation,
the element of the displeased Sunni Arab masses is a very concrete issue for local
governments, as we shall see in the next point.
Sunni regimes distrusting Shiism
As we have seen at the beginning of this paper, different events in the region
recently marked the growing distrust of Sunni State regimes towards the per-
ceived al-madd ash-shi`i (‘the ‘Shiite Expansion’), thus securitizing it, and mak-
ing it an issue of national importance. In spite of the transnational dimension of
the Sunni-Shi`a dispute as described above, it’s basically national concerns,
translated in a discourse directed towards it’s own community. The statements
or interventions made by these governments are not to be seen as mere fears for
the Sunni identity of their country, but are signs of concern for the possible
influence of a revolutionary and political Shiism in their own backyard.
For example, in April 2009 the Egyptian government surprisingly declared to
have rounded up a Hezbollah cell on its territory. The leader was a certain
Muhammad Yusuf Mansur, of Lebanese nationality. The organization was not
only accused of planning to perpetrate attacks on targets of national strategic
importance; it was also involved in arms trafficking towards Gaza, and – more
notably – Shiite missionary activities. The Mubarak administration even
65. Al-Qaradawi is very critical about what he calls al-Madd ash-Shi`i (‘Shiite expansionalism’) noemt. In
an interview with the journal ash-Sharq al-Awsat in 2008 he complained about the rising number of Shi-
ites in different ‘Sunni countries’ such as Tunisia, Morocco and his native Egypt. He is irritated by the fact
that in these countries, the Shiite voice is heard more and more and accuses Iran of conducting a policy of
tabshir through the Ahl al-Bayt organization. Shaykh al-Qaradawi can’t give exact numbers, but points
out that one is not able to obtain these data due to the Shiite practice of taqiya (‘ash-Shaykh al-Qaradawi
li ash-Sharq al-Awsat: Duwal Kanat Sunniya Khalisa Asbaha Fiha Shi`a’, ash-Sharq al-Awsat, 25 Septem-
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accused the Muslim Brotherhood of having ties with the cell. In a response,
Hezbollah’s secretary-general Nasr Allah acknowledged that Mansur was
indeed a member of Hezbollah, but by stating that he was only there to support
Hamas in its resistance in Gaza, he made an appeal to the large popularity Hez-
bollah enjoys in the streets of Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood denied having
bonds with the organization, but stated that it supports Hezbollah’s political
efforts against Israel66.
For the Egyptian case, we can see additional reasons for stressing on the Hez-
bollah case. In the wake of the Gaza war, the Egyptian government lost a great
deal of the support of its own people, by keeping itself far from interfering in
the conflict. In this context, it would be highly convenient to play in the cards
of the Sunni Islamist concern of Shiite infiltration, thus profiling their rule as
protecting of the Arab, Sunni world, and at the same time accusing its main
adversaries of Shiite proselytism.
In March of that same year, Moroccan authorities cut their diplomatic ties with
Iran after allegations that the country supported terrorist groupings in Morocco.
Important element in the entire controversy was the charge of Shiite missionary
activities on Moroccan soil and, interestingly, in the European diaspora (cf.
infra). As a consequence, a large-scale operation was held to ban Shiite literature
from bookshops and markets in the big cities67. During the Idrissid period (8th-
10th century), Morocco was actually ruled by a Shiite dynasty, putting its stamp
on the country for centuries to come. It was only after the introduction of the
1996 Constitution, and the religious liberties attached to it, that the Moroccan
government was faced with a more assertive position of the small Shiite commu-
nity68, trying to organize itself in political groupings such as al-Ghadir. Here as
well, the successes of Hezbollah in the Middle East allegedly play a great role in
the current rise of the Shiite profile69.
66. ‘Jama`a al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin; la `alaqa lana bitanzim Hizb Allah fi Misr’, al-Quds al-`Arabi, 15
April 2009. The response of Hassan Nasr Allah is to be viewed on http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=7Oe_K2TJdp4.
67. ‘Hujja at-tashayyu` fi tabrir al-azma ad-diblumasiya ma`a Iran tanqalibu `ala as-salatat al-Magh-
ribiya’, al-Quds al-`Arabi, 20 March 2009; ‘Ba`da qat` al-`alaqat ma`a Iran .. ar-Rabat taqarara ghalaq
madrasa `Iraqiya “Shi`iya”‘, al-Quds al-`Arabi, 23 March 2009. An article in the Moroccan periodical
Maroc Hebdo spoke about ‘tens of thousands of youngsters who have converted to Shiism, mainly in the
North of the Country.’ The Iranian embassy was accused of arranging the entire processus, including
training in Qom (‘Le casse-tête chiite au Maroc’, Maroc Hebdo International, 20-26 March 2009).
68. Exact numbers are unknown, which makes threat assessment a very arbitrary exercise in this context.
69. Shiite intellectuals, such as Dris Hani, see Shiite Islamism as a desirable social initiative, but compati-
ble with the longings of their Sunni or Sufi compatriots. There are nevertheless indicators for groups of
Shiite radicals in the outskirts of Casablanca. (ZWEIRI Mahjoub & KÖNIG Christoph, ‘Are Shias Rising
in the Western Part of the Arab World? The Case of Morocco.’, Journal of North African Studies, n°13,
iv, p. 514-524).FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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Both cases show a renewed concern for the export of Iranian revolutionary ideas
towards their own countries and, the spillover of this ideology on the Islamist
opposition in their own political context. The Shiite government of Iraq and the
supreme élan of Hezbollah in the region do only add to the fears and concerns
of Sunni regimes for their own survival. The pan-Islamic ideals of the Iranian
Revolution and a more assertive Shiite profile raise worries in Sunni countries
of a higher appeal towards their own citizens. The pragmatic Iranian foreign
policy and its refined influence building are seen as a challenge. Sunni States like
Egypt or Saudi Arabia fear losing their strategic position in the region and the
Arab world towards the west to the ‘Iranian camp’.
2.2. Large scale tashayyu` between myth and reality
Let us now take a deeper look at the phenomenon of tashayyu` (‘the act of
becoming Shiite’). Conversions from Sunnism to Shiism traditionally took place
for very pragmatic reasons such as heritage rights or mut`a (‘temporal marriage’,
allowed in Shiism). Nowadays it is also perceived as the Iranian weapon to gain
support in the Sunni streets. The propagation and spread of the Iranian Islamic
thought is an existing practice that is fitted in the ‘siyasat-i dast-i gol’-approach
(cf. supra). The tabshir (‘proselytism’) is therefore a means used by Iran to prop-
agate its ideology in the larger context of Middle Eastern politics.
The first source of the Sunni fear for tashayyu`, probably the most known and
most overlooked channel, is the media. This visibility is without any doubt a big
factor in the distrust radical Sunnites cherish towards their Shiite coreligionists.
Numerous satellite TV channels of ‘Shiite signature’ can be viewed throughout
the Middle East and the rest of the world. Famous examples are Hezbollah’s al-
Manar (‘the Light House’) and the Iranian al-`Alam (‘the World’) station70. Next
to that, the Internet is becoming a very useful tool. It is remarkable to which
extent Shiite clerics and their institutions are able to fully exploit the possibilities
of the Internet, offering an entire range of Shiite literature on their website71.
The second type of proselytism happens through a more organized channel, by
founding mosques or institutes, organizing courses, travels to Iran, and so on. It
is mainly the al-Majma` al-`Alami li Ahl al-Bayt (‘World Association for the
70. The Iranian channel al-`Alam was taken off air in November 2009 by the Arabian providers Arabsat
and Nilesat, according to some due to the fear for the influence excercised by the Satellite channel. (‘Iran
Arabic channel taken off air’, BBC News, 4 November 2009 (http://news.bbc.co.uk; consulted on 06
November 2009).
71. A good example of this is the portal site ‘al-Shia’ of grand ayatollah Sistani (http://www.al-shia.org/),
available in not less than 30 languages.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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People of the House [of the Prophet]’) that co-ordinates activities of proselytism
and the promotion of Shiism. It was founded in 1990 by traditionalist elements
within the Iranian religious elite, as a counterpart of al-Majma` al-`Alami li ‘t-
Taqrib. The difference between these two Iranian institutions is the fact that al-
Majma` Ahl al-Bayt aims at safeguarding the influence amongst Shiite commu-
nities abroad under the Iranian Supreme Leader, as well as the dissemination of
publications on Iranian revolutionary Shiite ideology and the construction of
Shiite religious edifices, rather than promoting rapprochement between the two
sides72.
But in the controversy of Shiite missionary activities, one question is asked too
little: what exactly do we speak of when discussing tashayyu`? First of all, one
must realize that ‘converting’ from Sunnism to Shiism is not a well-defined mat-
ter. There is no defined rite de passage, like one can discern in converting, for
example, from Christianity to Islam or vice versa73. One stays within the same
religion and is only going to follow a different interpretation of that faith,
expressed in the participation of the rituals involved. One of the consequences,
is that it is very difficult to obtain objective figures on Sunni-Shi`a conversions.
Even political interests or a fear for personal safety of the individual believer
hinder correct statistics. In short, when treating Sunni-Shi`a conversion, one is
discussing a highly arbitrary and ungraspable matter.
One of the few studies completed on this matter is the report ‘The Shiitization
Process in Syria 1985-2005: a socio-statistic paper’, issued in 2006 by the
National Council for Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Syria, a human rights
organization based in France, and funded by the European Union. This project
investigated the true extent of tabshir and tashayyu` in Syria, the country where
these practices are allegedly conducted on a very large scale. In this country, the
conversion controversy has the potential of becoming a national security threat
in combination with deteriorating economic and demographic situation and an
autocratic minority rule. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood accuses the Assad
administration of accommodating Shiite proselytism in order to deepen its
bonds with the Iranian government. Although there apparently is some truth in
it (Shiite preachers and cultural centers have enjoyed a greater liberty since the
72. Within the Iranian foreign policy, al-Majma` al-`Alami li Ahl al-Bayt has always had a priority status
over al-Majma` al-`Alami li ‘t-Taqrib. (BUCHTA Wilfried, ‘Tehran’s Ecumenical Society’, p. 351). See also
http://www.ahl-ul-bait.org/ and the portal site http://www.ahlulbaytportal.com. The organization holds
conferences on their activities every four years, the last one being 2007. Recently, the Majma` has also
opened a news site (http://www.abna.ir/) and a television station (ath-Thaqalayn).
73. Some observers have claimed that adding the phrase `Aliyan Wali Allahi (‘`Ali is the close friend of
God’) to the shahada (‘confession of faith’) is a transition rite by which Sunnites convert to Shiism. Differ-
ent maraji` have issued fatwas against this practice, possibly because doing so might add to the miscon-
ceptions that radical Sunnites have on Shiism, and their veneration for `Ali (For such a fatwa by Sistani,
see http://www.sistani.org/local.php?modules=extra&eid=4; accessed on 22 October 2009).FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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accession of president Bashar al-Assad in 2000), the 2006 report came to
remarkable findings. It contradicts some of the ruling conceptions in the region.
It largely puts the extent of tashayyu` into perspective, and notes that conver-
sions mostly occur within the `Alawi population, accounting for 85% of all
converts. The rest is distributed over other currents: about 2% is actually Sunni.
In most cases, these Sunni families were Shiite in the past, so it is mostly a re-
affirmation of their Shiite identity. There were no defined socio-economical cir-
cles that were more probable of converting, and tashayyu` in exchange for
money proved to be marginal. Some Sunni converts stated to have taken up
Shiism out of admiration for Hassan Nasr Allah and the Hezbollah victory over
Israel in 200674.
In Syria, tabshir has the biggest effect on indigenous Shiite currents; very few
Sunnites are affected by it. The primary target audience of the Iranian tabshir
can thus be considered as the endogenous Shiite community. The actual reason
for this might be as pragmatic as the tactical Iranian support to groupings such
as Hezbollah or Hamas: gaining a political foothold in the countries involved by
gaining the support or at least the sympathy of Shiite communities. If Sunnites
are receptive towards the promotion of the Iranian Revolutionary brand of
Islamism, it can only be an advantage. It must be noted that by an aggressive
and proactive campaign of promoting Shiism to Sunnites, Iran is risking large
opposition from Sunnites in the region, thus undermining its own political
agenda.
Also, the popularity of groupings like Hezbollah, the sympathy for the Iranian
defiance of Israel and the West and the disillusionment of Sunnis with their gov-
ernments and the role they play in regional politics, cause the perception of these
Sunni sympathizers of ‘adopting a Shiite profile’. In other words, the true mean-
ing of the tashayyu` feared by Sunni actors is to be seen in the light of political
leanings or support: becoming pro-Iran, pro-Hezbollah and their politics. The
most important element in the practice of tashayyu` in this case is not the reli-
gious aspect, the taking part in the rites of the Shiites. Conversion becomes a
change in the political allegiance of the Sunni believer, and in combination with
the more universal characteristics, associated with Shiite Islamic thought, and
thus, in the eyes of many Sunni actors, associated with Iran.
74. ELAD-ALTMAN Israël, ‘The Sunni-Shi`a Conversion Controversy’, Current Trends in Islamist Ideol-
ogy, n°5, 2007, p. 3; ‘Bahth hawla at-tashayyu` fi Suriya’, al-Ilaf, 7 January 2007 (www.elaph.com [Ara-
bic]); SINDAWI Khalid, ‘The Shiite Turn in Syria’, Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, n°8, 2009, p. 82-
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The very ungraspable nature and arbitrary numbers of the tashayyu` contro-
versy, in combination with the Wahhabi inspired views of Shiites being secretive
and underhanded (eg. the practice of taqiya (‘dissimulation of religion’), the
batini (‘hidden’) nature of Shiism itself), makes this paradigm a very useful polit-
ical tool. It fits into a political game for influence that has been played in the
Middle East for the last decades. But there is also a possible side effect to the
situation: there are indications that the anti-Shiite stance of Sunni governments
finds its way to the Muslim in the street, tilting the popular perception towards
an anti-Shiite, Wahhabi flavored stance. In this way, instrumentalized religious
identities can become a cause of conflict. While the infiltration of Shiism
becomes an apparent threat in ‘Sunni’ countries, it is remarkable that they often
have a history of Shiite presence, and as such their populations have tradition-
ally lived next to each other without much of a problem. Moreover, due to the
presence of a confessional form of Islam, they even had common religious
grounds. With the apparent diminution of this confessional Islam, the twilight
zone between the two sides threatens to fall away, giving more chance of fric-
tion. There is not much reason, however, to assume that this in itself can become
a large-scale, region-wide conflict.
2.3. European Muslims and Sunni-Shi`a tensions
Europe and the Shiite community
In the European Islamic diaspora, the religious dimension of Shiism seems to be
able to maintain even within a context where believers cannot directly rely on a
local marja` or the presence of famous religious scholars. The attachment of the
Shiite generations born in Europe to the marja`iya is getting under considerable
pressure; new ways of staying in touch are taking over. While in earlier years,
the clerical networks depended on a large scale on the wukala´ (‘deputies’) of the
marja` at-taqlid, modern channels of communication, such as the Internet, ena-
ble believers abroad to address the marja` himself, or one of his collaborators
through his website, to seek religious advise. Shiite clerics make extensive use of
the Internet in their effort to stay in touch with their followers, by distributing
literature on Shiism, posting audio files of their khutba, and giving fatwas on
demand. In this way, Shiite communities in Europe seem to be able to develop a
more direct link with the marja`iya of their choice. However, the question
remains whether through this way all the needs of the Shiite community are met:FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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a lot of them still long for a personal representation of a marja`75.
When we study the same issue on a European level, London seems to be sticking
out above the rest as a haven of Islamic diversity. The city has benefited from
the limited success of Iran in portrait itself as the center of Shiism, as well as the
problematic sectarian situations in Iraq and Lebanon. During the past decennia,
many refugees, mostly from Iraq, found their way to the British capital. They
often belonged to opposition organizations like ad-Da`wa and SCIRI, a lot of
them are still represented there until today76. Of course, its role as the center of
a former colonial power is also a major factor. The number of Shiites in this city
is still within proportion to the Sunni Muslims. While Shiite leaders claim their
number is approximately 15-20% of the local Muslims, British authorities state
their number is not higher than 5%77. The city houses the representational
organs of different maraji`.
The most famous one is without doubt the Imam al-Khu´i Foundation, with
branches in London and New York. This institution is a sort of a family enter-
prise for assisting Shiites in Great Britain in leading an Islamic life in the
diaspora, in the tradition of Grand Ayatollah al-Khu´i (d. 1992). This happens
through education, translation of religious texts into English, organizing cul-
tural events and building mosques. The al-Khu´i foundation keeps connections
between the believer and the hawza of Najaf, or even the office of Muhammad
Hussayn Fadl Allah in Lebanon. The most important role played by the Foun-
dation is maybe its attempts to build a better image on Islam through better
communication with non-Muslims and by counseling Western authorities on
Shiite Islam. In 1997, they even obtained ‘General Advisory Status’ to the United
Nations, through which it organizes its work in the field of Human Rights.
At the same time, however, the same recruiting mechanisms as deployed within
the Middle East have found their way into Europe, in order to recruit the Mus-
lim elements for its political ambitions. Propaganda spread by publications, Sat-
ellite TV stations78 or Internet sites and forums is one of the most effective
recruiting factors for both Sunnism and Shiism. Also, we can find the same
75. LEICHTMAN Mara A., ‘Transnational Scholarly Family Networks: the Role of the Shi`i Marja`iyya
in London and New York’, unpublished article, 2009, p. 20 (research to be edited by Peter Mandaville,
for the ‘Pew Forum for Religion and Public Life’, Washington DC).
76. RAHE Jens-Uwe, ‘Iraqi Shi’is in Exile in London’, in: `ABDUL-JABAR Faleh (ed.), Ayatollah’s Sufi’s
and Ideologues: State, religion and Social Reform in Iraq, Saqi Books, London, 2002, p. 212-213.
77. LEICHTMAN Mara A., ‘Transnational Scholarly Family Networks’, p. 20.
78. In Germany, Hezbollah television station al-Manar, has been banned from broadcasting, due to its
subversive nature towards the State of Israel (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Verfassungsbericht 2008,
19 May 2009, p. 233-234 (http://www.verfassungsschutz.de/download/SHOW/vsbericht2008.pdf).FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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methods of building an influence within the European Muslim community
through a more active and direct kind of proselytism79.
An example of this Shiite proselytism can be seen in Germany. The Bundesamt
für Verfassungsschutz referred in 2008 to the Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg
(IZH) as the centre for German Shi`a and their propagation. The organization
is located near the Imam `Ali mosque in Hamburg, in 1962 erected. IZH not
only arrange religious festivities, it also reaches out to other Shi`a associations
in Germany, both on an organizational level, as on a financial one. Although the
IZH portrays itself as a religious foundation, the Verfassungsschutz points out
that:
“Towards the outside world, the IZH acts as a mere religious organiza-
tion that does not include political activities in its direct field of work. [...]
In reality however, IZH spreads the Shiite teachings of Iranian brand, as
one of the most active centers of Iranian propaganda in Europe. Its actual
task is the ‘subtle propagation’ of an Islamic theocratic State after Iranian
example”80.
In other words, centers like these serve to gain influence amongst the Shiite com-
munities in Europe by promoting the Iranian political brand of Shiism to the
local Shiites. Here, like we saw in Syria, converting Sunni Muslims to Shiism
does not seem to be a goal in itself81.
This political propagation, and the distant threat a perceived proselytism might
pose, is certainly a thorn in the eye of the Wahhabi and Salafi inspired trends
within the European Islamic diaspora. These trends are widely present in
Europe, and often base their criticism, on mere religious elements. However
these radical tendencies remain a concern for the European domestic security
policy; for examining the evolution of Sunni-Shia relations, they are not repre-
sentative for the Sunni position. In the sector of Sunni Islamism, shaykh Yusuf
al-Qaradawi is also an influential figure for European Muslims. He heads the
‘European Council for Fatawa and Research’ (ECFR) and the ‘International
79. Mechanisms of Iranian proselytism in Europe also fall under the umbrella of the Majma` Ahl al-Bayt.
In the period 2003-2007, the Majma` would have organized ‘religious and cultural education’ for about
1000 persons, amongst which were British, German, Belgian and Dutch nationals (CUTA, De Nieuwe
soenni-sji`a Polemiek: Impact op Moslimgemeenschappen in België?, 02 September 2009, p. 3 (Report
requested by EGMONT). In London, the in 1998 founded Islamic Centre of England can be pointed out
as a representative of the Iranian Islamic State doctrine (WALBRIDGE Linda S, ‘The Counterreformation:
Becoming a Marja` in the Modern World’, in: WALBRIDGE Linda S, The Most Learned of the Shi`a: the
Institution of the Marja` Taqlid, Oxford University Press, Oxford & New York, 2001, p. 239; http://
www.ic-el.org/, consulted on 24 November 2009).
80. Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Verfassungsbericht 2008, 19 May 2009, p. 255 (http://www.verfas-
sungsschutz.de/download/SHOW/vsbericht2008.pdf).
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Union of Muslim Scholars’ (IUMS)82, both with headquarters in Dublin. It is
thus important to see that al-Qaradawi’s anti-Shiite position will eventually find
its way to European Sunnites.
The level on which a split between Sunnism-Shiism on European soil can
become as a security issue is largely political, as two instrumentalized identities
that are being deployed within a political conflict. In other words, there can be
a moment when the instruments of recruitment and mobilization become rea-
sons for strife themselves, when both identities are taken from their political
context, into a more transcendent level. If this situation is further fomented by
political actors in Europe and abroad, or by references to events and situations
in Muslim World, such a situation might possibly escalate into incidents. The
pretence in this case could be any minor event. It seems unlikely that large-scale
violence between the different currents of Islam will occur in Europe itself, not
in the least due to the small number of Shiites.
In London, authorities have actively supported initiatives to bridge differences
within the Muslim community. In 2006, the Mosques and Imams National
Advisory Body (MINAB) was formed83, which started its activities in May
2009. This was the outcome of the work of the Muslim Taskforce, a group
called into life by the British Government in 2005, to give operational recom-
mendations after the attacks of 7 July of that year. MINAB organizes formation
for imams and tries to promote good governance of mosques. By positioning
Muslims behind the common goal of social promotion, MINAB tries to prevent
extremism, overcome sectarianism and promote social cohesion within the
Islamic community. In MINAB, different branches of Islam meet; the Shiite
movement is represented by the al-Khu´i Foundation. Middle of 2009, the initi-
ative counted about 600 members from different confessional background. The
organization also reaches out towards the more radical streams amongst UK
Muslims, but on this level, a lot of work remains to be done84. The organization
keeps itself far from political involvement, so it will not be able to diminish the
process of instrumentalization or the political battle for the Muslim hearts. It is
however a perfect factor in preventing or combating sectarianism on the basis
82. The websites of these organizations are respectively http://www.e-cfr.org/ and http://www.iumson-
line.net/ (accessed on 25 October 2009). Yusuf al-Qaradawi also runs the famous portal site http://
www.islamonline.net.
83. The founding member organizations of MINAB are the al-Khu´i Foundation, The Muslim Council of
Britain, The Muslim Association of Britain and The British Muslim Forum. The organization represents
about 600 mosques and institutions (http://www.minab.org.uk/about-us/about-us, accessed on 31 Octo-
ber 2009).
84. ‘Watchdog for UK mosques launches’, BBC News, 27 juni 2006; http://www.minab.org.uk/about-us/
about-us (accessed on 30 October 2009); ‘Developments of Shi’a-Sunni Relations in the UK with Special
Reference to the Middle East’, presentation as delivered by prof. sayyid Yusuf al-Khu´i on the ‘Interna-
tional Conference on Sunni-Shia contemporary Relations’, Brussels, 2 October 2009.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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of religious pretexts, lining up their members behind the common goal of amel-
iorating their status within the country.
Belgium and the Moroccan community
The Sunni-Shi`a situation within the Belgian Muslim community85 is generally
dominated by a controversy hanging over the Moroccan diaspora in the coun-
try. As we already discussed, Moroccan authorities are nervous about the
alleged augmentation of the Shiite Muslims in their own country, to such an
extent that they recently cut their diplomatic ties with Iran86.
The last couple of years, Moroccan security services consider Shiite activities of
proselytism amongst nationals living in Europe – especially in Belgium – as one
of the most imminent threats to their country. These Shiite converts in their turn
would spread Shiism and deploy anti-governmental activities in their country of
origin. On 29 September 2009, the ambassador of Morocco Sami Addahre
stated in an interview to the periodical ‘Le Vif’:
“We in Morocco do everything within our power to support this co-ope-
ration [i.e. between Moroccan and Belgian security services]. One of the
means, and I want to emphasize this, is to allow, in the context of a con-
certed action, that Morocco guides the Moroccan community in Belgium,
in conformity with its values of tolerance and openness, that are shared
by both our countries, and are a trade mark of the Moroccan Islam,
Sunni, of Maliki rite. This Islam has nothing to do with Shiism or Wahha-
bism. Morocco has indeed frozen its diplomatic relations with Iran for
reasons of its proselytism on the national territories, and in the Moroccan
diaspora.”87
The discourse as given by the ambassador fits within the concerns raised by
governments of Sunni countries. Shiism is identified with Iranian meddling,
while few exact numbers regarding these conversions are available. The preser-
85. One of the best-known Shiite mosques in Belgium is the ‘Rida – Association islamique’ (a mosque and
non-profit organization) in Anderlecht. In February 2007, the mosque filed a complaint at the local police
of being menaced by Sunni elements. Authorities soon declared that this evolution was to be seen within
the context of the war in Iraq (‘Tensions irakiennes jusqu’à Anderlecht’, La Libre Belgique, 16 February
2007). Other institutions are ‘Centre Islamique Culturel Chiite – Ahlou al Bayt’ in Brussels and the ‘Alza-
hraa Center’ in Berchem, Antwerp (http://aqaed.org/theshia/moasesat/europ/belgium.html [Arabic]; con-
sulted on 24 November 2009).
86. ‘Hujja at-tashayyu` fi tabrir al-azma ad-diblumasiya ma`a Iran tanqalibu `ala as-salatat al-Magh-
ribiya’, al-Quds al-`Arabi, 20 March 2009; ‘Ba`da qat`al-`Alaqat ma`a Iran .. ar-Rabat taqarara ghalaq
madrasa `Iraqiya “Shi`iya”‘, al-Quds al-`Arabi, 23 March 2009.
87. ‘Marocains en Belgique: l’interview-vérité de l’ambassadeur du Maroc’, Le Vif, 29 September 2009.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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vation of the Moroccan national identity is in this context closely connected to
survival of the national rule and its geopolitical interests.
The actual link between Shiism and Islamists opposing the Moroccan authori-
ties seemed to come to the fore when in January 2008 a Belgian national with
Moroccan roots, Abd al-Qadir Belliraj was arrested in his land of origin on the
claims of leading a terrorist cell, allegedly planning the overthrow of the Moroc-
can State. The rumour also spread that the man was in fact Shiite. In fact, Bel-
liraj was trained during the 1980s in Hezbollah facilities in the Middle East, and
even met Imam Khomeini. He stated during interrogations that he was a Sunni,
making use of different subversive networks, amongst which Iranian ones.
These networks, that at the time still served the Iranian foreign policy of a vio-
lent exportation of the Islamic Revolution, are now considered to be gone. So,
we can see that indeed the link was there at the time, but that it can be consid-
ered as mere opportunism from the side of Belliraj. The Shiite infiltration in
Morocco seems to be much more a sign of the deeper lying political tension of
opposition to the legitimacy of the Moroccan government, than it is a religious
or doctrinal issue threatening the identity of the country or foreign meddling88.
Apart from the Moroccan controversy, we can ask ourselves if a possibility of
Sunni-Shi`a strife or violence actually exists in Belgium. In this case, the largest
threat comes from Salafi and Wahhabi inspired radical movements. A report
from the Belgian Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA) states:
“For most of the Muslims [in Belgium], the demonization of Shi`a Islam
is not an issue. Only already radicalized circles, Salafi and Salafiya Jiha-
diya, consider the new political anti-Shi`a discours as a mobilizing factor.
As a matter of fact, recently, ‘conferences’ treating this theme have been
organized in Belgian radical mosques. The tone is denigrating and xenop-
hobe towards the Shi`a community. A trend most concerning, that merits
further follow-up.”89
Polarization in general day-to-day Sunni-Shi`a relations seems not to be a secu-
rity issue: the problem lies with already radicalized movements. But while they
foment against Shiism, they also foment against everyone who is not on the
same hard line as them, thus making them target of the Belgian security policy
anyway. In this way, the Belgian situation does not differ that much from what
we have seen in the overall European theatre, and should be treated in the very
88. Interview with officials of the Belgian Federal Police; ‘Morocco’s efforts to tackle Islamists’, The
Economist, 21 February 2008. Among the people arrested was a certain Abdul Hafiz Sriti of the al-Manar
TV channel. This might be a reason for the Moroccan authorities to suspect Iranian meddling.
89. CUTA, De Nieuwe soenni-sji`a Polemiek, p. 3. One of these conferences was ‘l’Islam et le Chiisme’, a
lecture given by the Salafi preacher Abu Khayma, on 18 April 2009 in Charleroi (Ibid., p. 7, n. 4).FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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same way: as a political struggle for the hearts of the local Muslims. If conflicts
will occur, they are to be expected from this very dimension.FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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3. Conclusions and Recommendations
To conclude, we should revisit some of the core issues, that add to the demarca-
tion of the Sunni-Shi`a controversy and how to approach it. The movement of
Shiite Islamism has originated in the Middle East as a reaction to historical
events (the end of the Ottoman empire and the beginning of colonialism, the
foundation of national States), and as a drive to obtain social promotion of the
Shiites. The Iranian Revolution is to be seen as one of the pinnacles of this move-
ment, not as the beginning of it. In other countries, Shiite movements were
working to fulfill their own agendas, finding their inspiration in different cur-
rents within Shiite Islamism. It is therefore practically impossible to speak about
a major shift in power; it is more the ongoing search of Shiites to claim their
place in society.
The role Iran plays in using Shiite actors in the region is not to be overestimated,
since it is more of a tactical nature than a strategic one. Iran’s own hegemonic
ambitions have always to be considered in this regard: by having deepened rela-
tions with allies such as ISCI and Hezbollah and supporting them in all their
independence, the Islamic Republic guarantees itself of their loyalty, and has
political clout in the country involved. Shiite Islam is used in the same way, as a
means for promoting its revolutionary ideals in the Middle East.
When we consider the current opposition between Sunnis and Shiites, we have
to keep in mind that this dichotomy is not an absolute one, and that the extreme
Wahhabi position is a rather limited one. Distrust is becoming more overt, nev-
ertheless, with moderate clerics such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi taking a firm stand
in opposition to the perceived Shiite influence. Concrete measures taken by
Sunni regimes in the framework of concern for the ‘Shiite Threat’, show in this
way their fear for internal implications of militant Islamism of Iranian brand,
for spill-over or sympathy of national Islamist opposition towards this current.
The success of Hezbollah in the Sunni streets and the Iranian defiance towards
the West only adds to this fear. On a more international level, the unease of
possibly losing a strategic position to the ‘Iranian camp’ plays a non-negligible
role.
The specter of large-scale tashayyu` that is raised by Sunnites, is more a political
weapon to counter Iranian influence than it is actually a strategic tool that
threatens the identity of Sunni countries. Iranian Shiite organizations recruit
mainly towards Shiites, even in the European diaspora. There are no objective
numbers on the alleged conversions, nor are there indications that the Sunni-
Shiite opposition as a religious model is becoming a security issue. The same
applies to conversions within the Belgian Moroccan community. Anti-Shiite dis-FEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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course and ideology can be found in Belgium, but are still situated within radi-
calized milieus that are already considered as a concern of security. In the long
run, the biggest threat to Sunni-Shi`a relations comes from a progressed instru-
mentalization of these religious identities by Middle Eastern governments, find-
ing their way to the Muslim in the street, and eventually becoming a motive for
violence.
Recommendations for the EU and Belgium
• The process of policy making should not be influenced by the fear for a
‘Shiite Crescent’: the Shiite Islamist movement is in its conception a socio-
political movement that is focused on a national reality, now more than ever.
However it looks towards the transnational structure of Shiite Islam for
ideological reasons, it does not serve a transnational cause for Shiite
empowerment.
• When dealing with intra-Islamic relations, the diversity within Shiism or
Islam as a whole and the views connected to them should be taken into
account. Equally, if not more important than confessional affiliation are ele-
ments like family, tribal bonds, societal standing, economical factors, that
often transgress the apparent limits of ideological divisions within Islam.
• The Iranian role in the Middle East is to be seen in the framework of its own
pragmatic foreign policy and its hegemonic ambitions. The support it gives
to Shiite groupings is of a tactical nature. It would be wrong to simply iden-
tify the political and material goals of Iran with those of the Shiites as a
whole. There is no consensus over the Iranian political model, or any other
for that part. Iran’s perceived allies (eg. Hezbollah) should be seen as natio-
nal movements and relations between the EU and these actors should be
assessed on this very basis.
• Policy makers will have to involve Shiite clerical actors into their approach
towards the Middle East. Recent history proved that `ulama´ can and will
play a role in the socio-political developments of their community, even if
they are known as being ‘quietist’.
• The Shiite movement is best approached by demanding their respective
governments to grant their Shiite communities basic human rights and full-
fledged civil rights. This seems to be the most effective way in preventing
unrest and future radicalization.
• The fear of Sunni States like Saudi Arabia or Egypt for losing their strategic
position in the region will get bigger, and if this would be accompanied withFEARING A ‘SHIITE OCTOPUS’
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further anti-Shiite rhetoric, the EU and Belgium have to face growing mis-
trust and enmity with the knowledge that this controversy is located within
a political context, not a intrinsic conflict between two opposing ideological
currents.
• Belgium and the EU as a whole will have to keep in mind that the political
instrumentalization of both religious identities is a bigger problem than an
intrinsic antagonism between Sunnism and Shiism.
• Instrumentalization of Sunni-Shiite can – in the long run – be the cause of
future conflicts in the Middle East or Europe. The rhetoric or actual actions
of governments in the Middle east or the Muslim World as a whole could
inflict damage on what is best described as a ‘sectarian ecology’ within Islam,
a natural co-existence of Sunni and Shi`a communities, with different forms
of confessional Islam acting as a buffer. It is not likely that a mere religious
opposition will lead to an open war or a great conflict; small-scale unrest is
more plausible.